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 
Abstract— Today’s vehicles are complex distributed embedded 
systems that are increasingly being connected to various external 
systems. Unfortunately, this increased connectivity makes the 
vehicles vulnerable to security attacks that can be catastrophic. In 
this work, we present a novel Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
called INDRA that utilizes a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) based 
recurrent autoencoder to detect anomalies in Controller Area 
Network (CAN) bus-based automotive embedded systems. We 
evaluate our proposed framework under different attack scenarios 
and also compare it with the best known prior works in this area. 
 
Index Terms— Intrusion detection, network security, artificial 
neural networks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ODERN vehicles can be considered as complex 
distributed embedded systems that consist of tens of 
interconnected Electronic Control Units (ECUs). These ECUs 
control various components in the vehicle and communicate 
with each other using the in-vehicle network. The number of 
ECUs and the complexity of software running on these ECUs 
has been steadily increasing in emerging vehicles, to support 
state-of-the-art Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) 
features such as lane keep assist, collision warning, blind spot 
warning, parking assist, etc. This in turn has resulted in an 
increase in the complexity of the in-vehicle network, which is 
the backbone over which massive volumes of heterogeneous 
sensor and real-time decision data and control directives are 
communicated.  
The trend in recent ADAS solutions has been to interact with 
external systems using advanced communication standards 
such as Vehicle-to-X (V2X) and 5G technology [1]. 
Unfortunately, this makes modern vehicles highly vulnerable to 
various security attacks that can be catastrophic. Several attacks 
have been demonstrated in [2]-[4] showing different ways to 
gain access to the in-vehicle network and take control of the 
vehicle via malicious messages. With connected and 
autonomous vehicles becoming increasingly ubiquitous, these 
security issues will only get worse. Hence, it is crucial to  
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prevent unauthorized access of in-vehicle networks from 
external attackers to ensure the security of automotive systems. 
Traditionally, firewalls are used to defend a network from 
various external attackers. However, no firewall is perfect and 
no network is impenetrable. Hence, there is a need for an active 
monitoring system that scans the network to detect the presence 
of an attacker in the system. This can be achieved using an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) which monitors’ network 
traffic and triggers alerts when suspicious activity or known 
threats are detected. The IDS is often the last line of defense in 
automotive systems.  
IDSs can be classified into two types: (i) signature-based, 
and (ii) anomaly-based. The former observes for traces of any 
known attack signatures while the latter observes for the 
deviation from the known normal system behavior to indicate 
the presence of an attacker. Signature-based IDS can have faster 
detection times and very few false positives, but can only detect 
known attacks. On the other hand, anomaly-based IDS can 
detect both known and unknown attacks, but can suffer from 
higher false positives and relatively slower detection times. An 
efficient IDS needs to be lightweight, robust and scalable with 
different system sizes. Moreover, a pragmatic IDS needs to 
have a large coverage of attacks (able to detect both known and 
unknown attacks), high confidence in detection, and low false 
positive rate as recovery from false positives can be expensive. 
Since getting the signature of every possible attack is 
impractical and would limit us to only detecting known attacks, 
we conjecture that using anomaly-based IDS is a more practical 
approach to this problem. Additionally, due to the ease of in-
vehicle network data acquisition (from test driving), there can 
be a large amount of in-vehicle message data to work with, 
which facilitates the use of advanced deep learning models for 
detecting the presence of an attacker in the system. 
In this article, we propose a novel IDS framework called 
INDRA that monitors the messages in Controller Area Network 
(CAN) based automotive systems for the presence of an 
attacker. In the offline phase, INDRA uses deep learning to learn 
the normal system behavior in an unsupervised fashion. At 
runtime, INDRA monitors the network and indicates the 
presence of an attacker if any anomalies (any deviation from the 
normal behavior learned during the offline phase) are detected. 
INDRA aims to maximize the detection accuracy and minimize 
false positive rate with minimal overhead on the ECUs. 
Our novel contributions in this work are as follows: 
 We propose a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) based recurrent 
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autoencoder network to learn the latent representation of 
normal system behavior during the offline phase;   
 We propose a metric called intrusion score (IS), which is a 
measure of deviation from the normal system behavior; 
 We perform a thorough analysis towards the selection of 
thresholds for this intrusion score metric; 
 We compare our proposed INDRA framework with the best 
known prior works in the area, to show its effectiveness.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Several techniques have been proposed to design IDS for 
time-critical automotive systems. The goal of these works is to 
detect various types of attacks by monitoring the in-vehicle 
network traffic. 
Signature-based IDS relies on detecting known and pre-
modeled attack signatures. The authors in [5], used a language 
theory-based model to derive attack signatures. However, this 
technique fails to detect intrusions when it misses the packets 
transmitted during the early stages of an attack. In [6], the 
authors used transition matrices to detect intrusions in a CAN 
bus. In spite of achieving a low false-positive rate for trivial 
attacks, this technique failed to detect realistic replay attacks. 
The authors in [7] identify notable attack patterns such as an 
increase in message frequency and missing messages to detect 
intrusions. A specification-based approach to detect intrusions 
is proposed in [8], where the authors analyze the behavior of the 
system and compare it with the predefined attack patterns to 
detect intrusions. Nonetheless, their system fails to detect 
unknown attacks. In [9], an IDS technique using the Myers 
algorithm [10] was proposed under the map-reduce framework. 
A time-frequency analysis of CAN messages is used in [11] to 
detect multiple intrusions. A rule-based regular operating mode 
region is derived in [12] by analyzing the message frequency at 
design time. This region is observed for deviations at runtime 
to detect anomalies. In [13], fingerprints of the sender ECU’s 
clock skew and the messages are used to detect intrusions by 
observing for variations in the clock-skew at runtime. In [14], a 
formal analysis is presented for clock-skew based IDS and 
evaluated on a real vehicle. A memory heat map is used to 
characterize the memory behavior of the operating system to 
detect intrusions in [15]. An entropy-based IDS is proposed in 
[16] that observes for change in system entropy to detect 
intrusions. However, the technique fails to detect small scale 
attacks where the entropy change is minimal. In summary, 
signature-based techniques offer a solution to the intrusion 
detection problem with low false positive rates but cannot 
detect more complex and novel attacks. Moreover, modeling 
signatures of every possible attack is impractical. 
Anomaly-based IDS aims to learn the normal system 
behavior in an offline phase and observe for any deviation from 
the learned normal behavior to detect intrusions at runtime. A 
sensor-based IDS was proposed in [17], that utilizes attack 
detection sensors to monitor various system events to observe 
for deviations from normal behavior. However, this approach is 
not only expensive but also suffers from poor detection rates. A 
One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) based IDS was 
proposed in [18]. However, this approach suffers from poor 
detection latency. In [19], the authors used four different nearest 
neighbor classifiers to distinguish between a normal and an 
attack induced CAN payload. In [20], a decision-tree based 
detection model is proposed to monitor the physical features of 
the vehicle to detect intrusions. However, this model is not 
realistic and suffers from high detection latencies. A Hidden 
Markov Model (HMM) based technique was proposed in [21] 
that monitors the temporal relationships between messages to 
detect intrusions. A deep neural network based approach was 
proposed to examine the messages in the in-vehicle network in 
[22]. This approach is tuned for a low priority tire pressure 
monitoring system (TPMS), which makes it hard to adapt to 
high priority safety-critical powertrain applications. A Long 
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) based IDS for multi-message ID 
detection was proposed in [23]. However, the model 
architecture is highly complex, which incurs high overhead on 
the ECUs. In [24], the authors use LSTM based IDS to detect 
insertion and dropping attacks (explained in section IV C). An 
LSTM based predictor model is proposed in [25] that predicts 
the next time step message value at a bit level and observes for 
large variations in loss to detect intrusions. In [26], a recurrent 
neural network (RNN) based IDS was proposed to learn the 
normal patterns in CAN messages in the in-vehicle network. A 
hybrid IDS was proposed in [27], which utilizes a specification-
based system in the first stage and an RNN based model in the 
second stage to detect anomalies in time-series data. However, 
none of these techniques provides a holistic system-level 
solution that is lightweight, scalable, and reliable to detect 
multiple types of attacks for in-vehicle networks. 
In this paper, we propose a lightweight recurrent autoencoder 
based IDS using gated recurrent units (GRUs) that monitors 
messages at a signal level granularity to detect multiple types 
of attacks more effectively and successfully than the state of the 
art. Table I summarizes some of the state-of-the-art works’ 
performance under different metrics and shows how our 
proposed INDRA framework fills the existing research gap. The 
INDRA framework aims at improving multiple performance 
metrics compared to the state-of-the art IDS works that target a 
subset of performance metrics. A detailed analysis of each 
metric and evaluation results are presented later in section VI. 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON BETWEEN PROPOSED INDRA FRAMEWORK  
AND STATE-OF-THE-ART WORK 
Technique 
Performance metrics 
Lightweight Low False Positive Rate 
High 
accuracy 
Fast 
Inference  
PLSTM [25] X  X X 
RepNet [26]  X X  
CANet [23] X   X 
INDRA     
III. SEQUENCE LEARNING BACKGROUND 
With the availability of increased computing power from 
GPUs and custom accelerators, training neural networks with 
many hidden layers (known as deep neural networks) has led to 
the creation of powerful models for solving difficult problems 
  
in many domains. One such problem is detecting intrusions in 
the in-vehicle network. In an in-vehicle network, the 
communication between ECUs happens in a time-dependent 
manner. Hence, there exist temporal relationships between the 
messages, which is essential to exploit, in order to detect 
intrusions. However, this cannot be achieved using traditional 
feedforward neural networks where the output of any input is 
independent of the other inputs. Sequence models are a more 
appropriate approach for such problems, as they are designed to 
handle sequences and time-series data.  
A. Sequence Models 
A sequence model can be understood as a function which 
ensures that the output is dependent not only on the current 
input, but also on the previous inputs. An example of such a 
sequence model is the recurrent neural network (RNN), which 
was introduced in [28]. In recent years, other sequence models 
such as long short-term memory (LSTM) and gated recurrent 
unit (GRU) have also been developed. 
1) Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN)  
An RNN is a type of neural network which takes sequential 
data as the input and learns the relationship between data 
sequences. RNNs have hidden states, which allows learned 
information to persist over time steps. The hidden states enable 
the RNN to connect previous information to current inputs. An 
RNN cell with feedback is shown in Fig. 1a, and an unrolled 
RNN in time is shown in Fig. 1b. 
  
 
(a) 
 
        (b) 
Figure 1: (a) A single RNN cell and (b) unrolled RNN unit; where, f is the RNN 
cell, x is the input, and h represents hidden states. 
 
The output ℎ௧ of an RNN cell is a function of both the input 
ݔ௧ and the previous output ℎ௧ିଵ: 
 
ℎ௧ =  ݂(ܹݔ௧ + ܷℎ௧ିଵ + ܾ)                      (1) 
 
where W, U are weight matrices, b is a bias term, and f is a 
nonlinear activation function (e.g. sigmoid or tanh). One of the 
limitations of RNNs is that they are very hard to train. Since 
RNNs and other sequence models deal with sequence or time-
series inputs, backpropagation happens through various time 
samples (known as backpropagation through time). During this 
process, the feedback loop in RNNs causes the errors to shrink 
or grow rapidly (creating vanishing or exploding gradients 
respectively), destroying the information in backpropagation. 
This problem of vanishing gradients hampers the RNNs from 
learning long term dependencies. This problem was solved in 
[29] with the introduction of additional states and gates in the 
RNN cell to remember long term dependencies, which led to 
the introduction of Long Short-Term Memory Networks. 
 
2) Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) Networks  
LSTMs are modified RNNs that use cell state and hidden 
state information along with multiple gates to remember long 
term dependencies. The cell state can be thought of as a 
transport highway, that carries relevant information throughout 
the processing of a sequence. The state accommodates the 
information from earlier time steps, which can be used in the 
later time steps, thereby reducing the effects of short-term 
memory. The information in the cell state is modified via gates. 
Hence, the gates in LSTM help the model decide which 
information has to be retained and which information to forget. 
 
  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2: (a) A single LSTM cell with different gates and (b) unrolled LSTM 
unit; where, f is an LSTM cell, x is input, c is cell state and h is the hidden state. 
 
An LSTM cell consists of 3 gates: (i) forget gate (ft) (ii) input 
gate (it), and (iii) output gate (ot) as shown in Fig.2(a). The 
forget gate is a binary gate that chooses which information to 
retain from the previous cell state (ct-1). The input gate adds 
relevant information to the cell state (ct). Lastly, the output layer 
is controlled by the output gate, which uses information from 
the previous two gates to produce an output. An unrolled LSTM 
unit is shown in Fig. 2b. 
By using the combination of different gates and hidden 
states, LSTMs can learn long term dependencies in a sequence. 
However, they are not computationally efficient as the sequence 
path is more complicated than in RNNs, due to the addition of 
multiple gates, requiring more memory at runtime. Moreover, 
training LSTMs is compute intensive even with advanced 
training methods such as truncated backpropagation. To 
overcome these limitations, a simpler recurrent neural network 
called gated recurrent unit (GRU) network was introduced in 
[30] that can be trained faster than LSTMs and also remembers 
dependencies in long sequences with low memory overhead, 
while solving the vanishing gradient problem. 
 
3) Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)  
A GRU cell uses an alternate route for gating information 
when compared to LSTMs. It combines the input and forget 
gate of the LSTM into a solitary update gate and furthermore 
combines hidden and cell state, as shown in Fig 3a and 3b. 
 
  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3: (a) A single GRU cell with different gates and (b) unrolled GRU unit; 
where, f is a GRU cell, x is input, and h represents hidden states. 
 
A traditional GRU cell has two gates (i) reset gate and (ii) 
update gate. The reset gate combines new input with past 
memory while the update layer chooses the amount of pertinent 
data that should be held. Thus, a GRU cell can control the data 
stream like an LSTM by uncovering its hidden layer contents. 
Moreover, GRUs achieve this using fewer gates and states, 
  
which makes them computationally more efficient with low 
memory overhead. As real-time automotive ECUs are highly 
resource-constrained embedded systems with tight energy and 
power budgets, it is critical to use low overhead models for 
inferencing tasks. Thus, GRU based networks are an ideal fit 
for inference in automotive systems. Additionally, GRUs are 
relatively new, less explored and have a lot of potential to offer 
compared to the RNNs and LSTMs. Hence, in this work, we 
chose to use a lightweight GRU based model to implement our 
IDS (explained in detail in section V). 
One of the advantages of sequence models is that they can be 
trained using both supervised and unsupervised learning 
approaches. As there is a large volume of CAN message data in 
a vehicle, labeling the data can become very tedious. 
Additionally, the variability in the messages between vehicle 
models from the same manufacturer and the proprietary nature 
of this information, makes it even more challenging to label 
messages correctly. However, due to the ease of availability to 
CAN message data via onboard diagnostics (OBD-II), large 
amounts of unlabeled data can be collected easily. Thus, we use 
GRUs in an unsupervised learning setting in this work. 
 
 
Figure 4: Autoencoders 
B. Autoencoders 
An autoencoder is an unsupervised learning algorithm whose 
goal is to reconstruct the input by learning latent input features. 
It achieves this by encoding the input data (x) towards a hidden 
layer, and finally decodes it to produce a reconstruction  ݔ෤ (as 
shown in Fig. 4). This encoding at the hidden layer is called an 
embedding. The layers that create this embedding are called the 
encoder, and the layers that reconstruct the embedding into the 
original input are called the decoder.  During training, the 
encoder tries to learn a nonlinear mapping of the inputs, while 
the decoder tries to learn the nonlinear mapping of the 
embedding to the inputs. Both encoder and decoder achieve this 
with the help of non-linear activation functions, e.g., tanh, and 
relu. Moreover, the autoencoder aims to recreate the input as 
accurately as possible by extracting the key features from the 
inputs with a goal of minimizing reconstruction loss. The most 
commonly used loss functions in autoencoders are mean 
squared error (MSE) and Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.  
As autoencoders aim to reconstruct the input by learning the 
underlying distribution of the input data, it makes them an ideal 
choice to learn and reconstruct highly correlated time-series 
data efficiently by learning the temporal relations between 
signals. Hence, our proposed INDRA framework uses light 
weight GRUs in an autoencoder to learn latent representations 
of CAN messages in an unsupervised learning setting. 
 
 
Figure 5: Overview of the system model 
IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. System Model 
We consider a generic automotive system consisting of 
multiple ECUs connected using a CAN based in-vehicle 
network, as shown in Fig. 5. Each ECU is responsible for 
running a set of automotive applications that are hard-real time 
in nature, meaning they have strict timing and deadline 
constraints. In addition, we assume that each ECU also executes 
intrusion detection applications that are responsible for 
monitoring and detecting intrusions in the in-vehicle network. 
We consider a distributed IDS approach (intrusion applications 
collocated with automotive applications) as opposed to a 
centralized IDS approach where one central ECU handles all 
intrusion detection tasks due to the following reasons: 
 A centralized IDS approach is prone to single-point failures, 
which can completely open up the system to the attacker. 
 In extreme scenarios such as during a flooding attack 
(explained in section IV-C), the in-vehicle network can get 
highly congested and the centralized system might not be 
able to communicate with the victim ECUs. 
 If an attacker succeeds in fooling the centralized IDS ECU, 
attacks can go undetected by the other ECUs, resulting in 
compromising the entire system; whereas with a distributed 
IDS, fooling multiple ECUs is required which is much 
harder, and even if an ECU is compromised, this can still be 
detected by the decentralized intelligence. 
 In a distributed IDS, ECUs can stop accepting messages as 
soon as an intrusion is detected without waiting for a 
centralized system to notify them, leading to faster response. 
 The computation load of IDS is split among the ECUs with a 
distributed IDS, and the monitoring can be limited to only the 
required messages. Thus, multiple ECUs can monitor a 
subset of messages independently, with lower overhead. 
 
Many prior works, e.g., in [5] and [12], consider a distributed 
IDS approach for these reasons. Moreover, with automotive 
ECUs becoming increasingly powerful, the collocation of IDS 
applications with real-time automotive applications in a 
distributed manner should not be a problem, provided the 
overhead from the IDS is minimal. Our proposed framework is 
not only lightweight, but also scalable, and achieves high 
intrusion detection performance, as discussed in Section VI. 
The design of an IDS should have low susceptibility to noise, 
low cost, and a low power/energy footprint. The following are 
some of the goals that we considered for our IDS: 
 Lightweight: Intrusion detection tasks can incur overhead on 
  
the ECUs that could result in poor application performance 
or missed deadlines for real-time applications. This can be 
catastrophic in some cases. Hence, we aim to have a 
lightweight IDS that incurs low overhead on the system. 
 Few false positives: This is a highly desired quality in any 
kind of IDS (even outside of the automotive domain), as 
handling false positives can become expensive very quickly. 
A good IDS needs to have few false positives or false alarms. 
 Coverage: This is the range of attacks an IDS can detect. A 
good IDS needs to be able to detect more than one type of 
attack. A high coverage for IDS will make the system 
resilient to multiple attack surfaces. 
 Scalability: This is an important requirement as emerging 
vehicles have increasing numbers of ECUs, and high 
software and network complexity. A good IDS should be 
highly scalable and be able to support multiple system sizes. 
 
Figure 6: Standard CAN frame format 
 
B. Communication Model 
In this subsection, we discuss the vehicle communication 
model that was considered. We primarily focus on detecting 
intrusions in a CAN bus-based automotive system. Controller 
Area Network (CAN) is the defacto industry standard in-
vehicle network protocol for automotive systems today. CAN 
is a lightweight, low cost, and event-triggered communication 
protocol that transmits messages in the form of frames. The 
structure of a standard CAN frame is shown in Fig. 6 and the 
length of each field (in bits) is shown on the top. The standard 
CAN frame consists of header, payload, and trailer segments. 
The header consists of information such as the message 
identifier (ID) and the length of the message. The actual data 
that needs to be transmitted is in the payload segment. The 
trailer section is mainly used for error checking at the receiver. 
A variation of the standard CAN, called CAN-extended or CAN 
2.0B is also becoming increasingly common in modern 
vehicles. The major difference is that CAN extended has a 29-
bit identifier allowing for more number of messages IDs. 
 
 
Figure 7: Real-world CAN message with signal information 
 
In this work, we design our IDS with a focus on monitoring 
the message payload and observe for anomalies to detect 
intrusions. This is because an attacker needs to modify the 
message payload to accomplish a malicious activity. While an 
attacker could target the header or trailer segments, it would 
result in the message getting rejected at the receiver. The 
payload segment consists of multiple data entities called 
signals. An example real-world CAN message with the signals 
is shown in Fig. 7 [31]. Each signal has a fixed size (in bits), a 
particular data type, and a start bit that specifies its location in 
the 64-bit payload segment of the CAN message. 
In this work, we focus on monitoring individual signals 
within message payloads to observe for anomalies and detect 
intrusions. Our model learns the temporal dependencies 
between the messages at a signal level during training and 
observes for deviations at runtime to detect intrusions. Signal 
level monitoring would give us the capability to not only detect 
the presence of an intruder but also helps in identifying the 
signal within the message that is being targeted during an 
attack. This can be valuable information for understanding the 
intentions of the attacker, which can be used for developing 
countermeasures. The details about the signal level monitoring 
of our IDS are discussed in section V-B. Note: Even though in 
this work we focus on detecting intrusions by monitoring CAN 
messages, our approach is protocol-agnostic and can be used 
with other in-vehicle network protocols. 
C. Attack Model 
Our proposed IDS aims to protect the vehicle from multiple 
types of attacks listed below. These are some of the most 
common and hard to detect attacks, and have been widely 
considered in literature to evaluate IDS models. 
 
(1) Flooding attack: This is the most common and easy to 
launch attack and requires no knowledge about the system. In 
this attack, the attacker floods the in-vehicle network with a 
random or specific message and prevents the other ECUs from 
communicating. These attacks are generally detected and 
prevented by the bridges and gateways in the in-vehicle 
network and often do not reach the last line of defense (the 
IDS). However, it is important to consider these attacks as they 
can have a severe impact when not handled correctly. 
 
(2) Plateau attack: In this attack, an attacker overwrites a 
signal value with a constant value over a period of time. The 
severity of this attack depends on the magnitude of the jump 
(increase in signal value) and the duration for which it is held. 
Large jumps are easier to detect compared to shorter jumps. 
 
(3) Continuous attack: In this attack, an attacker slowly 
overwrites the signal value with the goal of achieving some 
target value and avoid triggering of an IDS in the system. This 
attack is hard to detect and can be sensitive to the IDS 
parameters (discussed in section V-B). 
 
(4) Suppress attack: In this attack, the attacker suppresses the 
signal value(s) by either disabling the communication controller 
of the target ECU or by powering off the ECU. These attacks 
can be easily detected, as they shut down message transmission 
for long durations, but are harder to detect for shorter durations. 
 
(5) Playback attack: In this attack, the attacker replays a valid 
series of message transmissions from the past trying to trick the 
IDS. This attack is hard to detect if the IDS does not have the 
ability to capture the temporal relationships between messages. 
In this work, we assume that the attacker can gain access to 
the vehicle using the most common attack vectors, which 
include connecting to V2X systems that communicate with the 
outside world (such as infotainment and connected ADAS 
systems), connecting to the OBD-II port, probe-based snooping 
  
on the in-vehicle bus, and via replacing an existing ECU. We 
also assume that the attacker has access to the bus parameters 
(such as BAUD rate, parity, flow control, etc.) that can help in 
gaining access to the in-vehicle network. 
 
Problem objective: The goal of our work is to implement a 
lightweight IDS that can detect multiple types of attacks (as 
mentioned above) in a CAN based automotive system, with a 
high detection accuracy and low false positive rate, and while 
maintaining a large attack coverage. 
 
 
Figure 8: Overview of proposed INDRA framework 
V. INDRA FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW 
We propose the INDRA framework to enable a signal level 
anomaly-based IDS for monitoring CAN messages in 
automotive embedded systems. An overview of the proposed 
framework is shown in Fig. 8. At a high level, the INDRA 
framework consists of design-time and runtime components. At 
design time, INDRA uses trusted CAN message data to train a 
recurrent autoencoder based model to learn the normal behavior 
of the system. At runtime, the trained recurrent autoencoder 
model is used for observing deviations from normal behavior 
(inference) and detect intrusions based on the deviation 
computed using the proposed intrusion score metric (detection). 
The following subsections describe these steps in more detail. 
A. Recurrent Autoencoder 
Recurrent autoencoders are powerful neural networks that 
are designed to behave like an encoder-decoder but handle 
time-series or sequence data as inputs. They can be visualized 
as regular feed-forward neural network based autoencoders, 
with the neurons being RNN, LSTM or GRU cells (discussed 
in section III). Similar to regular autoencoders, the recurrent 
autoencoders have an encoder and a decoder stage. The encoder 
is responsible for generating a latent representation of the input 
data in an n-dimensional space. The decoder uses the latent 
representation from the encoder and tries to reconstruct the 
input data with minimal error. In this work, we propose a new 
lightweight recurrent autoencoder model, that is customized for 
the design of IDS to detect intrusions in the in-vehicle network 
data. The details of the proposed model architecture and the 
stages involved in its training are discussed next. 
 
1) Model Architecture  
The proposed recurrent autoencoder model architecture with 
the dimensions (input, output) of each layer is illustrated in Fig. 
9. The model consists of a linear layer at the input, GRU based 
encoder, GRU based decoder and a final linear layer before the 
output. The input to the first linear layer is the time-series of 
CAN message data with signal level values with f features 
(where f is the number of signals in that particular message). 
The output of the linear layer is given to the GRU based encoder 
to generate the latent representation of the time-series signal 
inputs. We call this latent representation as a message context 
vector (MCV). The MCV captures the context of different 
signals in the input message data, and hence has a vector form. 
Each value in the MCV can be thought of as a point in an n-
dimensional space that contains the context of the series of 
signal values given as input. The MCV is fed into a GRU based 
decoder, which is then followed by a linear layer to reconstruct 
the input time-series of CAN message data with individual 
signal level values. Mean square error (MSE) is used to 
compute the loss between the input and the reconstructed input. 
Weights are updated using backpropagation through time. We 
design a recurrent autoencoder model for each message ID. 
 
 
Figure 9: Proposed recurrent autoencoder network (f is number of features i.e., 
number of signals in the input CAN message, MCV is message context vector) 
 
2) Training Process  
The training process begins with the pre-processing of the 
CAN message data. Each sample in the dataset consists of a 
message ID and corresponding values of the signals within that 
message ID. The signal values are scaled between 0 to 1 for 
each signal type, as the range of signal values can be very large 
in some cases. Using such unscaled inputs can result in an 
extremely slow or very unstable training process. Moreover, as 
our goal is to reconstruct the input, scaling signal values also 
helps us avoid the problem of exploding gradients. 
 
 
Figure 10: Rolling window based approach 
 
After pre-processing the available data for training, it is split 
into training data (85%) and validation data (15%), and is 
prepared for training using a rolling window based approach. 
This involves selecting a window of fixed size and rolling it to 
the right by one time sample every time step. A rolling window 
size of three samples for three time steps is illustrated in Fig. 
10, where the term ܵ ௜
௝  represents the ith signal value at jth sample. 
The elements in the rolling window are collectively called as a 
subsequence and the subsequence size is equal to the size of the 
rolling window. As each subsequence consists of a set of signal 
  
values over time, the proposed recurrent autoencoder model 
tries to learn the temporal relationships that exist between the 
series of signal values. These signal level temporal relationships 
help in identifying more complex attacks such as continuous 
and playback (as discussed in section IV-C). The process of 
training using subsequences is done iteratively until the end of 
the sequence in training data.  
During training, each iteration consists of a forward pass and 
a backward pass using backpropagation through time to update 
the weights and biases of the neurons (discussed in section III) 
based on the error value. At the end of the training, the model’s 
learning is evaluated (forward pass only) using the validation 
data, which was not seen during the training. By the end of 
validation, the model has seen the full dataset once and this is 
known as an epoch. The model is trained for multiple epochs 
until the model reaches convergence. Moreover, the process of 
training and validation using subsequences is sped up by 
training the input data in groups subsequences known as mini-
batches. Each mini-batch consists of multiple consecutive 
subsequences that are given to the model in parallel. The size 
of each mini-batch is commonly called batch size and it is a 
common practice to choose the batch size as a power of two. 
Lastly, to control the rate of update of parameters during 
backpropagation, a learning rate needs to be specified to the 
model. These hyperparameters such as subsequence size, batch 
size, learning rate, etc., are presented later in section VI-A. 
B. Inference and Detection 
At runtime, the trained model is set to evaluation mode, 
meaning only the forward passes occur and the weights are not 
updated. In this phase, we can test for multiple attack scenarios 
(mentioned in Section IV-C), by simulating appropriate attack 
condition in the CAN message dataset.  
Every data sample that goes through the model gets 
reconstructed and the reconstruction loss is sent to the detection 
module to compute a metric called intrusion score (IS). The IS 
helps us in identifying whether a signal is malicious or normal. 
We compute IS at a signal level to predict the signal that is 
under attack. The IS is computed at every iteration during 
inference, as a squared error to estimate the prediction 
deviation from the input signal value, as shown in (2). 
 
ܫ ௜ܵ = ቀ൫ ௜ܵ௝ − መܵ௜௝൯ଶቁ     ∀ ݅ ∈ [1,݉]       (2) 
 
where, ௜ܵ
௝  represents ith signal value at jth sample, መܵ௜
௝  denotes 
its reconstruction, and m is the number of signals in the 
message. We observe a large deviation for predicted value from 
the input signal value (i.e., large IS value), when the signal 
pattern is not seen during the training phase, and a minimal IS 
value otherwise. This is the basis for our detection phase.  
As we do not have a signal level intrusion label information 
in the dataset, we combine the signal level IS information into 
a message-level IS, by taking the maximum IS of the signals in 
that message as shown in (3). 
 
ܯܫܵ = max(ܫ ଵܵ, ܫܵଶ … , ܫܵ௠)         (3) 
 
In order to get adequate detection accuracy, the intrusion 
threshold (IT) for flagging messages needs to be selected 
carefully. We explored multiple choices for IT, using the best 
model from the training process. The best model is defined as 
the model with the lowest validation running loss during the 
training process. From this model, we log multiple metrics such 
as maximum, mean, median, 99.99%, 99.9%, 99% and 90% 
validation loss across all iterations as the choices for the IT. The 
analysis of IT metrics is presented in section VI-B. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 11: Snapshot of our proposed IDS checking a message with three signals 
under a plateau attack, where (a) shows the signal comparisons and (b) shows 
IS for signals and IS for the message and Intrusion flag 
 
A snapshot of our IDS working in an environment with 
attacks is illustrated in Fig. 11a and 11b, with a plateau attack 
on a message with three signals, between time 0 and 50. Fig.11a 
shows the input (true) vs IDS predicted signal value 
comparisons for 3 signals. The red highlighted area represents 
the attack interval. It can be seen that for most of the time, the 
reconstruction is close for almost all signals except during the 
attack interval. Signal 3 is subjected to a plateau attack where 
the attacker held a constant value until the end of attack interval 
as shown in the third subplot of Fig. 11a (note the larger 
difference between the predicted and actual input signal values 
in that subplot, compared to for signals 1 and 2). Fig.11b shows 
the different signal intrusion scores for the 3 signals. The dotted 
black line is the intrusion threshold (IT). As mentioned earlier, 
the maximum of signal intrusion scores is chosen as message 
intrusion score (MIS), which in this case is the IS of signal 3. It 
  
can be observed from Fig. 11b that the intrusion score of signal 
3 is above the IT, for the entire duration of the attack interval, 
highlighting the ability of INDRA to detect such attacks. The 
value of IT (equal to 0.002) in Fig. 11b is computed using the 
method discussed in section VI-B. Note that this value is 
specific to the example case shown in Fig. 11, and is not the 
threshold value used for our remaining experiments. Section 
VI.C describes how we select the IT value for our framework. 
VI. EXPERIMENTS 
A. Experimental Setup 
To evaluate the performance of the INDRA framework, we 
first present an analysis for the selection of intrusion threshold 
(IT). Using the derived IT, we contrast it against the two 
variants of the same framework: INDRA-LED and INDRA-LD. 
The former removes the linear layer before the output and 
essentially leaving the GRU to decode the context vector. The 
term LED implies, (L)linear layer, (E) encoder GRU and (D) 
decoder GRU. The second variation replaces the GRU and the 
linear layer at the decoder with a series of linear layers (LD 
implies linear decoder). These experiments were conducted to 
test the importance of different layers in the network. However, 
the encoder end of the network is not changed because we 
require a sequence model to generate an encoding of the time-
series data. We explored other variants as well, but they are not 
included in the discussion as their performance was poor 
compared to the LED and LD variants. 
Subsequently, we compare the best variant of our framework 
with three prior works:  Predictor LSTM (PLSTM [25]), 
Replicator Neural Network (RepNet [26]), and CANet [23]. 
The first comparison work (PLSTM) uses an LSTM based 
network that is trained to predict the signal values in the next 
message transmission. PLSTM achieves this by taking the 64-
bit CAN message payload as the input, and learns to predict the 
signal at a bit-level granularity by minimizing the prediction 
loss. A log loss or binary cross-entropy loss function is used to 
monitor the bit level deviations between the real next signal 
values and the predicted next signal values, and the gradient of 
this loss function is computed using backpropagation to update 
the weights in the network. During runtime, PLSTM uses the 
prediction loss value to decide if that particular message is 
malicious or not. The second comparison work (RepNet) uses a 
series of RNN layers to increase the dimensionality of the input 
data and reconstruct the signal values by reducing back to the 
original dimensionality. RepNet achieves this by minimizing 
the mean squared error between the input and the reconstructed 
signal values. At runtime, large deviations between the input 
received signal and the reconstructed signal values are used to 
detect intrusions. Lastly, CANet unifies multiple LSTMs and 
linear layers in an autoencoder architecture and uses a quadratic 
loss function to minimize the signal reconstruction error. All 
experiments conducted with the INDRA variations and prior 
works are discussed in further subsections. 
To evaluate our proposed framework with its variants and 
against prior works we used the SynCAN dataset that was 
developed by ETAS and Robert Bosch GmbH [23]. The dataset 
consists of CAN message data for 10 different IDs modeled 
after real-world CAN message data. The dataset comes with 
both training and test data with multiple attacks as discussed in 
section IV-C. Each row in the dataset consists of a timestamp, 
message ID, and individual signal values. Additionally, there is 
a label column in the test data with either 0 or 1 values 
indicating normal or malicious messages. The label information 
is available on a per message basis and does not indicate which 
signal within the message is subjected to the attack. We use this 
label information to evaluate our proposed IDS over several 
metrics such as detection accuracy and false positive rate, as is 
discussed in detail in the next subsections. Moreover, to 
simulate a more realistic attack scenario in the in-vehicle 
networks, the test data has normal CAN traffic between the 
attack injections. Note: We do not use the label information in 
the training data when training our model, as our model learns 
the patterns in the input data in an unsupervised manner. 
All the machine learning based frameworks (INDRA and its 
variants, and comparison works) are implemented using 
Pytorch 1.4. We conducted several experiments to select the 
best performing model hyperparameters (number of layers, 
hidden unit sizes, and activation functions). The final model 
discussed in section V-A was trained using the SynCAN data 
set by splitting 85% of train data for training and the remaining 
for validation. The validation data is mainly used to evaluate 
the performance of the model at the end of every epoch. We 
trained the model for 500 epochs, using a rolling window 
approach (as discussed in section V-A.2) with the subsequence 
size of 20 messages and the batch size of 128. We also 
implemented an early stopping mechanism that monitors the 
validation loss across epochs and stops the training process if 
there is no improvement after 10 (patience) epochs. We chose 
the initial learning rate as 0.0001, and apply tanh activations 
after each linear and GRU layers. Moreover, we used the 
ADAM optimizer with the mean squared error (MSE) as the 
loss criterion. During testing, we used the trained model 
parameters and considered multiple test data inputs to simulate 
attack scenarios. We monitored the intrusion score metric (as 
described in section V-C) and the computed intrusion threshold 
to flag the message as malicious or normal. We computed 
several performance metrics such as detection accuracy, false 
positives, etc. to evaluate the performance of our model. All the 
simulations are run on an AMD Ryzen 9 3900X server with an 
Nvidia GeForce RTX 2080Ti GPU. 
 
Lastly, before showing the experimental results, we present 
the following definitions in the context of IDS: 
 True Positive (TP)- when the IDS detects an actual 
malicious message as malicious; 
 False Negative (FN)- when the IDS detects an actual 
malicious message as normal; 
 False Positive (FP)- when the IDS detects a normal 
message as malicious (aka false alarm); 
 True Negative (TN)- when the IDS detects an actual normal 
message as normal. 
 
We focus on two key performance metrics: (i) Detection 
accuracy- a measure of IDS ability to detect intrusions 
  
correctly, and (ii) False positive rate: also known as false alarm 
rate. These metrics are calculated as shown in (4) and (5): 
 
ܦ݁ݐ݁ܿݐ݅݋݊ ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ =   ்௉ା்ே
்௉ାிேାி௉ା்ே
         (4) 
 
ܨ݈ܽݏ݁ ܲ݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁ ܴܽݐ݁ = ி௉
ி௉ା்ே
                 (5) 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 12: Comparison of (a) detection accuracy, and (b) false positive rate for 
various candidate options of intrusion threshold (IT) as a function of validation 
loss under different attack scenarios. (% refers to percentile not percentage) 
B. Intrusion Threshold Selection 
In this subsection, we present an analysis for the selection of 
intrusion threshold (IT) by considering various options such as 
max, median, mean, and different quantile bins of validation 
loss of the final model. The model reconstruction error for the 
normal message should be much smaller than the error for 
malicious messages. Hence, we want to explore several 
candidate options to achieve this goal, that would work across 
multiple attack and no-attack scenarios. Having a large 
threshold value can make it harder for the model to detect the 
attacks that change the input pattern minimally (e.g., continuous 
attack). On the other hand, having a small threshold value can 
trigger multiple false alarms, which is highly undesirable. 
Hence it is important to select an appropriate threshold value to 
optimize the performance of the model.  
Fig. 12a and 12b illustrate the detection accuracy and false 
positive rate respectively for various candidate options to 
calculate IT, under different attack scenario. It is clear from the 
results in the figure that selecting higher validation loss as the 
IT can lead to a high accuracy and low false alarm rate. 
However, choosing a very high value (e.g., ‘max’ or ‘99.99 
percentile’) can sometimes result in missing small variations in 
the input patterns that are found in more sophisticated attacks. 
From our experiments we found the maximum and 99.99 
percentile values to be very close. In order to capture the attacks 
that produce small deviations, we selected a slightly smaller 
threshold that would still perform similar to max and 99.99 
percentile thresholds on all of our current attack scenarios. 
Hence, in this work, we choose the 99.9th percentile value of 
the validation loss as the value of the intrusion threshold (IT). 
We use the same IT value for the remainder of the experiments 
discussed in the next subsections. 
C. Comparison of INDRA Variants 
After selecting the correct intrusion threshold from the 
previous subsection, we use that criterion and evaluate our 
proposed INDRA framework with two other variants: INDRA-
LED, and INDRA-LD. The main intuition behind evaluating 
different variants of INDRA is to analyze the impact of different 
types of layers in the model on the performance metrics 
discussed in section VI-A. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 13: Comparison of (a) detection accuracy, and (b) false positive rate for 
INDRA and its variants INDRA-LED and INDRA-LD under different attack 
scenarios. 
 
  
Fig. 13a shows the detection accuracy for our INDRA 
framework and its variants on y-axis with different attack types 
and for a no-attack scenario (normal) on the x-axis. We can 
observe that INDRA outperforms the other two variants and has 
high accuracy in most of the attack scenarios. It is to be noted 
that the high accuracy is achieved by monitoring at a signal 
level unlike prior works that monitor at the message level.  
The false positive rate or false alarm rate of INDRA and other 
variants under different attack scenarios is shown in Fig. 13b. It 
is evident that INDRA has the lowest false positive rate and 
highest detection accuracy compared to the other variants. 
Moreover, INDRA-LED which is just short of a linear layer at 
the decoder end is the second best performing model after 
INDRA. INDRA-LED’s ability to use a GRU based decoder 
helps in reconstructing the MCV back to original signals. It can 
be clearly seen in both Fig. 13a and 13b, that the lack of GRU 
layers on the output decoder end for INDRA-LD leads to a 
significant performance degradation. Hence, we chose INDRA 
as our candidate model for subsequent experiments. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 14. Comparison of (a) detection accuracy, and (b) false positive rate of 
INDRA and the prior works PLSTM [25], RepNet [26] and CANet [23]. 
D. Comparison with Prior Works 
We compare our INDRA framework with PLSTM [25], 
RepNet [26] and CANet [23], which are some of the best known 
prior works in the IDS area. Fig. 14a and 14b show the detection 
accuracy and false positive rate respectively for the various 
techniques under different attack scenarios. 
From the results shown in Fig. 14, it is evident that INDRA 
achieves high accuracy for each attack scenario and also 
achieves low positive rates for most of the scenarios. The ability 
to monitor signal level variations along with the more cautious 
selection of intrusion threshold gives INDRA an advantage over 
comparison works. PLSTM and RepNet use the maximum 
validation loss in the final model as the threshold to detect 
intrusions in the system, while CANet uses interval based 
monitoring to detect attacks. Selecting a larger threshold helped 
PLSTM to achieve slightly lower false positive rates for some 
scenarios, but it hurt the ability of both PLSTM and RepNet to 
detect attacks with small variations in the input data. This is 
because the deviations produced by some of the complex 
attacks are small and due to the large thresholds the attacks go 
undetected. Moreover, the interval based monitoring in CANet 
struggles with finding an optimal value for the thresholds. 
Lastly, the false positive rates of INDRA are still significantly 
low with the maximum of 2.5% for plateau attacks. Please note 
that the y-axis in Fig. 14b has a much smaller scale than in Fig. 
14a, and the magnitude of the false positive rate is very small. 
E. IDS Overhead Analysis 
In this subsection, we present a detailed analysis of the 
overhead incurred by our proposed IDS. We quantify the 
overhead in terms of both memory footprint and time taken to 
process an incoming message i.e., inference time. The former 
metric is important as the resource constrained automotive 
ECUs have limited available memory, and it is crucial to have 
a low memory overhead to avoid interference with real-time 
automotive applications. The inference time not only provides 
important information about the time taken to detect the attacks, 
but also can be used to compute the utilization overhead on the 
ECU. Thus, we choose the abovementioned two metrics to 
analyze the overhead and quantify the lightweight nature of our 
proposed IDS. 
To accurately capture the overhead of our proposed INDRA 
framework and the prior works, we implemented our proposed 
IDS approach on an ARM Cortex- A57 CPU on a Jetson TX2 
board, which has similar specifications to the state-of-the-art 
multi-core ECUs. Table II presents the memory footprint of our 
proposed INDRA framework and the prior works mentioned in 
the previous subsections. It is clear that our proposed INDRA 
framework has a low memory footprint compared to the prior 
works, except for the RepNet [26]. However, it is important to 
observe that even though our proposed framework has slightly 
higher memory footprint compared to the RepNet [26], we 
outperform all of the prior works including RepNet [26] in all 
performance metrics under different attack scenarios, as shown 
in Fig. 14. The heavier (high memory footprint) models can 
provide the ability to capture a large variety of details about the 
system behavior, but they are not an ideal choice for resource 
constrained automotive systems. On the other hand, a much 
lighter model such as RepNet, fails to capture key details about 
the system behavior due to its limited parameters and therefore 
suffers from performance issues. 
 
  
TABLE II 
MEMORY FOOTPRINT COMPARISON BETWEEN INDRA FRAMEWORK AND 
THE PRIOR WORKS PLSTM [25], REPNET [26] AND CANET [23] 
 
Framework Memory footprint (KB) 
PLSTM [25] 13,417 
RepNet [26] 55 
CANet [23] 8,718 
INDRA 443 
 
TABLE III 
INFERENCE TIME COMPARISONS BETWEEN INDRA FRAMEWORK AND 
THE PRIOR WORKS PLSTM [25], REPNET [26] AND CANET [23] USING 
SINGLE CORE, AND DUAL CORE CONFIGURATIONS 
 
Framework 
Average inference time (µs) 
Single core ARM Cortex 
A57 CPU 
Dual core ARM Cortex 
A57 CPU 
PLSTM [25] 681.18 644.76 
RepNet [26] 19.46 21.46 
CANet [23] 395.63 378.72 
INDRA 80.35 72.91 
 
In order to understand the inference overhead, we 
benchmarked the different IDS frameworks on an ARM 
Cortex- A57 CPU. In this experiment, we consider different 
system configurations to encompass a wide variety of ECU 
hardware that is available in the state-of-the-art vehicles. Based 
on the available hardware resources on the Jetson TX2, we 
selected two different system configurations. The first 
configuration utilizes only one CPU core (single core), while 
the second configuration uses two CPU cores.  
We ran the frameworks 10 times for the different CPU 
configurations and computed the average inference time (in µs), 
as shown in Table III. From the results in table III, it is clear 
that our proposed INDRA framework has significantly faster 
inference times compared to the prior works (excluding 
RepNet) under all three configurations. This is partly due to the 
lower memory footprint of our proposed IDS. As mentioned 
earlier, even though RepNet has a lower inference time, it has 
the worst performance out of all frameworks, as shown in Fig. 
14. The large inference times for the better performing 
frameworks can impact the real-time performance of the control 
systems in the vehicle, and can result in catastrophic missing of 
deadlines. We also believe that using a dedicated deep learning 
accelerator (DLA) would give us significant speed up compared 
to the above presented configurations. 
Thus, from Fig. 14, and table II and table III, it is clear that 
INDRA achieves a clear balance of having superior intrusion 
detection performance while maintaining low memory footprint 
and fast inference times, making it a powerful and lightweight 
IDS solution. 
F. Scalability Results 
In this subsection we present an analysis on the scalability of 
our proposed IDS by studying the system performance using 
the ECU utilization metric as a function of increasing system 
complexity (number of ECUs and messages).  
Each ECU in our system model has a real-time utilization 
(URT) and an IDS utilization (UIDS) from running real-time and 
IDS applications respectively. In this work, we primarily focus 
on analyzing the IDS overhead (UIDS), as it is a measure of the 
compute efficiency of the IDS. Since the safety-critical 
messages monitored by the IDS are periodic in nature, the IDS 
can be modeled as a periodic application with period that is the 
same as the message period [32]. Thus, monitoring an ith 
message mi results in an induced IDS utilization (UIDS, mi) at an 
ECU, and can be computed as: 
ூܷ஽ௌ,௠೔  =  ൬்಺ವೄ௉೘೔ ൰          (6) 
where, TIDS and Pmi indicate the time taken by the IDS to process 
one message (inference time), and the period of the monitored 
message, respectively. Moreover, the sum of all IDS utilizations 
as a result of monitoring different messages is the overall IDS 
utilization at that ECU (UIDS) and is given by: 
 ூܷ஽ௌ  =  ෍ ூܷ஽ௌ,௠೔௡
௜ୀଵ
         (7) 
To evaluate the scalability of our proposed IDS, we consider 
six different system sizes. Moreover, we consider a pool of 
commonly used message periods {1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 45, 
50, 100} (all periods in ms) in automotive systems to sample 
uniformly, when assigning periods to the messages in the 
system. These messages are evenly distributed among different 
ECUs and the IDS utilization is computed using (6) and (7). In 
this work, we assume a pessimistic scenario where all of the 
ECUs in the system have only a single core. This would allow 
us to analyze the worst case overhead of the IDS. 
 
Fig. 15 Scalability results of our proposed IDS for different system sizes and 
the prior works PLSTM [25], RepNet [26] and CANet [23] 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the average ECU utilization under 
various system sizes denoted by {p, q}, where p is the number 
of ECUs and q is the number of messages in the system. A very 
pessimistic estimate of 50% real-time ECU utilization for real-
time automotive applications is assumed (“RT Util”, as shown 
in the dotted bars). The solid bars on top of the dotted bars 
represent the overhead incurred by the IDS executing on the 
ECUs, and the red horizontal dotted line represents the 100% 
ECU utilization mark. It is important to avoid exceeding the 
100% ECU utilization under any scenario, as it could induce 
undesired latencies that could result in missing deadlines for 
time-critical automotive applications, which can be 
catastrophic. It is clear from the results that the prior works 
  
PLSTM and CANet incur heavy overhead on the ECUs while 
RepNet and our proposed INDRA framework have very 
minimal overhead that scales favorably to increasing system 
sizes. From the results in this section (Figures 14, 15; Tables II, 
III), it is apparent that not only does INDRA achieve better 
performance in terms of both accuracy and low false positive 
rate for intrusion detection than state-of-the-art prior work, but 
it is also lightweight and scalable. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a novel recurrent autoencoder 
based lightweight intrusion detection system called INDRA for 
distributed automotive embedded systems. We proposed a 
metric called the intrusion score (IS), which measures the 
deviation of the prediction signal from the actual input. We also 
presented a thorough analysis of our intrusion threshold 
selection process and compared our approach with the best 
known prior works in this area. The promising results indicate 
a compelling potential for utilizing our proposed approach in 
emerging automotive platforms. In our future work, we plan to 
exploit the dependencies that exist between signals to improve 
the performance of our intrusion detection framework. 
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